



EL FARO AND UNIVISIÓN SPOKESPERSONS FOR THE GANGS

- ✓ The same repeated story: that Nayib Bukele negotiated with the gangs.
- ✓ In 2021, it had influence in the U.S. Department of State under the Joe Biden administration.
- ✓ By 2023, security results and cooperation against drug trafficking changed Biden's stance.
- ✓ Recycling a failed thesis seeks only to keep it alive and justify hefty salaries.
- ✓ Salvadorans' real concern is that security results are consolidated.



Benefits of the Nayib Bukele Presidency, backed by broad popular support

-  Governing seven years has not been easy, but it is possible with more than 90% support from citizens.
-  The 2021 elections gave President Nayib Bukele three key forms of support: the Executive Branch, the great majority of the people and the Legislative Assembly.
-  With a qualified majority (56 of 84 seats), two other key changes were achieved: renewing the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court and the leadership of the Attorney General's Office.
-  All with the firm conviction of serving the people and not political, economic, media or criminal power groups.



RESULTS THANKS TO POPULAR SUPPORT

- ✓ Control of the Legislative Assembly with a qualified majority.
- ✓ Renewal of the Supreme Court's Constitutional Chamber and the Attorney General's Office.
- ✓ Will, courage and independence to overcome resistance to change at the national and international level.
- ✓ Refounding the State to build a new El Salvador with solid and sustainable foundations.

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“ Politics must be measured, above all, by its ability to improve people's lives. El Salvador moves forward because governing is to serve, not to ideologize.





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El Faro and Univision: Spokespersons for the Gangs

El Faro and its financiers have just re-presented, now under the guise of the Univision platform, the same story they have been repeating for years: that Nayib Bukele negotiated with the gangs and that the security results were a consequence of those supposed agreements. The medium changes, but the argument and the materials are essentially the same, if anything with a few irrelevant and even ridiculous additions. The problem—for them—is that a speech as weak as that one does not become more convincing simply by repeating it to the point of exhaustion.

All in all, it must be acknowledged that, in 2021, the explosive thesis reached its greatest influence—not among the Salvadoran population, but in the Department of State of Joe Biden's government. At that time, the aforementioned activists came to constitute a privileged source of interpretation of Salvadoran reality for Washington. However, that began to change toward

2023, when the reality of the security results and the popular support for Bukele's administration became increasingly overwhelming. Those achievements, together with close collaboration in combating drug trafficking and irregular migration, contributed to Biden changing his stance, discarding conspiracy theories, and establishing a close collaborative relationship between both nations.

The essential problem of the accusation that El Faro and its acolytes fail to instill in the Salvadoran population is that it falls apart on its own. Its main weakness, among many that it has, is that it turns out to be implausible to believe that the





astute criminal gangs, who for years exercised territorial control in total impunity, would voluntarily decide to negotiate their own dismantling only to end up confined in CECOT or living in permanent flight.

As for its purpose, let us be clear that this "new" report is not intended to convince the Salvadoran people. The aspirants of El Faro are perverse, but not so foolish as to believe that. Perhaps it is directed at those who already bought that narrative in 2021 and later had to modify their position, but that hope appears vain. The recycling of a thesis that lost its moment of greatest influence—and that now survives in reduced media and political circuits— simply seeks to keep itself circulating and justify the lucrative salaries earned by its promoters.

But while they beg for credibility to be given to that failed account from six years ago, the concrete concern of Salvadorans is different: that the results achieved in security are not reversed and are consolidated.

Benefits of Nayib Bukele's Presidency, Backed by Broad Popular Support

Governing a country for seven years—the first two of these boycotted by politicians from parties defeated in the 2021 elections—has not been easy, but nor has it been impossible when holding the support of more than 90% of the citizens.

Reality demonstrates it: after achieving control of the Legislative Assembly by a broad majority through the popular will expressed in the 2021 elections, where 56 out of 84 seats were secured—a qualified majority—President Nayib Bukele had in his hands three gems of support (the Executive, the great majority of the Salvadoran people, and the Legislative Assembly).

This paved the way to achieve the other two gems of endorsement: the Legislative Assembly managed to change the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice and the leadership of the Attorney General's Office. All with the firm conviction of truly serving the interests of the population and not groups of political, economic, media, or criminal power that had been governing for many years.





In the new government, they embraced the will, courage, and independence to overcome the expected resistance to change at the national and international levels. The objective was clear: to refound the State, govern for the benefit of the population, and build the new El Salvador with solid, time-sustainable foundations. Along the way, it has been necessary to uproot the weeds that contaminated the nation, plant new vegetation, and harvest and sustain day-to-day life.

Since May 1, 2021, when the new Legislative Assembly took office with a qualified majority between the ruling party and allied parties, governability in El Salvador took another direction. Seven years into President Nayib Bukele's government, governability has allowed progress in many areas at an accelerated pace. The principal one is the control of security over territories dominated by criminal groups.

During these years there has been no work stoppage of significance in public or private institutions; street demonstrations have transpired in total freedom, without repression, without using a single can of tear gas as in previous governments; there has been no riot in penitentiary centers, no strikes by teachers' or doctors' unions, no transport stoppages, nor street blockades due to lack of water, among other protests that were common in previous years.

Traditional political parties and leaders have not achieved sufficient popular support to serve as an opposition; they have merely become persistent critics of the government's administration, but without major backing from public opinion. At the international level, a good example is not to the liking of some rulers, organizations, or media outlets, among others, although at the level of the people, the vision and support for the Bukele Model is different.

Governability has brought confidence and the resolve of private investors to develop projects in the country, more tourism, local investment, and mental health in political and social spheres. Without a doubt, political polarization, as of today, is non-existent; the massive support for the government's work, for the direction the country is taking, and the low support for "opposition" political parties is undoubtedly a perfect environment for the country to advance at an accelerated pace—as is occurring—not only dismantling the "governability" structure of the past, but also building the present and future of the new Salvadoran society.

Without fear of being mistaken, this environment being experienced in El Salvador is something many countries in the Americas and the world would desire. We are in an era of change where we have boarded the train of the future, where undoubtedly there will be many difficulties along the way, but with the confidence that we are moving in the right direction, where governability is a key piece to keep the train from derailing.

Why Is There No Political Opposition in El Salvador?



In any liberal democratic regime, the existence of an opposition is not a simple institutional ornament protected by the republic's constitution: it is a condition of health for the system. A weak, fragmented, or delegitimized opposition before the citizenry does not only lose elections; it ceases to fulfill its function as a political, social, and cultural component in the development of a country.

For the citizenry to perceive the opposition as viable, and not as a vestige of the past or a mere cortege, it must fulfill, at least, the following conditions.

- The first is offering a credible programmatic alternative, not just criticism. It is not enough to oppose; one must propose. The historic PDC maintained, in the midst of the military dictatorship of the 70s, a viable opposition with a concrete project, whose main objective was to dismantle the power of the landowning agro-exporting oligarchy, and had the capacity to create a country project with concrete economic, social, and parliamentary policies that the citizenry could imagine; however, upon reaching power, while it is true that it made decisions much more radical than those promulgated by its guerrilla arch-enemy, it was incapable of keeping itself clear of waste and corruption. Its criticism offered proposals, and was not based on buffoonery, coarse banter, or vulgar and impertinent jokes unbecoming of an educated person, nor on resentment.
- The second condition is having organizational autonomy and social roots. A viable opposition does not depend on the good will of those in power to exist: it has territorial bases, renewed leaderships, and genuine links with sectors of civil society, unions, academia, and communities. Without those roots, it becomes a disconnected political elite, easy to delegitimize as "the old politics."



- The third, if the previous ones prove insufficient or dispensable, is being recognized as legitimate by the ruling power and by the citizenry. The opposition needs to be able to exercise its function: to audit, denounce, compete, without being criminalized, judicially prosecuted, or stigmatized as an enemy of the State, as it was for decades in El Salvador. When dissenting is equated with betraying the nation, the opposition loses symbolic viability, even if formally it continues to exist.

Finally, it is necessary for the opposition to maintain credibility before the citizenry following its own past performance. In societies that have already experienced the failure or corruption of certain political forces, the opposition must demonstrate real renewal, not just a change of faces. Collective memory weighs heavily: whoever governed poorly does not automatically recover trust by the simple fact of now being out of power.

And with the unspoken voids, though signed, the Salvadoran contrast poses an El Salvador heading toward a new electoral process: the general elections are set for February 28, 2027, in which president, vice president, deputies to the Legislative Assembly, and municipal councils will be elected, with an official campaign between October 27, 2026, and February 24, 2027. In that scenario, the ideal conditions described above collide with a particular reality.

Regarding the programmatic alternative, ARENA and the FMLN —the parties that governed the country between 1989 and 2019— have already defined their tickets: former deputy Mayteé Iraheta for ARENA and union leader Rafael Aguirre for the FMLN, who begin the race with zero chances of defeating President Bukele.

Both have attempted to present proposals: Iraheta talks about "protecting" gains in security at the service of "greater collective progress," while Aguirre asks for a "national dialogue"; however, neither has managed to install a narrative that competes against the practices of the current government.

Regarding social roots, ARENA and the FMLN arrive at this process practically without representation in state posts, a fact that reveals the attrition of two organizations that in their time were the central poles of the Salvadoran party system, and paradoxically fell victim to all the invulnerabilities they believed they possessed. Finally, the context of public opinion is decisive: the president's approval exceeds 90%, sustained largely by the successful fight against the gangs that turned the country into one of the most violent in the world, and into a lucrative business for the old forces.



That genuine support coexists with a legitimate debate over whether electoral competition is substantive when a recent analysis warns that the Salvadoran case could represent the construction of an "opposition" that, paradoxically, helps consolidate the permanence in power of the one facing it, without the need to formally violate the law.

Those who support the government contend that Bukele's high popularity reflects a genuine democratic legitimacy, won through tangible results in security; and that the weakness of ARENA and the FMLN is the responsibility of their own governing history, not of officialdom.

Those who are critics warn that the concentration of legislative power, changes to electoral rules by the competing actor itself, and the narrative attrition imposed upon traditional parties configure a terrain where the opposition loses real viability regardless of its performance. Both readings coexist in the Salvadoran public debate heading into 2027, and the result next February will be, in itself, a test of how close or far the country is from the ideal conditions of a viable democratic opposition.

There is an intellectual and historical ruling that precedes the current state of the country: democracy was murdered by its progenitors. Democracy is the prolegomenon of asymmetrical power when it loses itself in its pretensions of infallibility, when it commits all the political errors it claimed to combat.

UNIFICTION: The Decadence of the Old Media Outlets





This week we witnessed a new deployment of orchestrated attacks against President Nayib Bukele, this time from the trench of a pseudo media outlet that enjoys greater recognition for its daytime talk shows, dating shows, and gossip programs than for any genuine attempt to foster intellectual awareness in society. Their ill-named "special" titled "The Two Faces of Bukele" was received by the Salvadoran audience not as serious journalism, but as a brazen and frontal mockery of the intelligence of the entire population.

The maneuver was so clumsy that it was impossible not to see the true origin of the material. It was evident that the pseudo-journalists from El Faro had been the architects of the script and production, while the television platform served merely as a showcase to launch the attack. We witnessed a rehash of a rehash, a desperate attempt to recycle worn-out narratives that no longer find an echo in the national reality.

But this behavior is, ultimately, understandable within the logic of desperation. Traditional media outlets are dying and feel forced to resort to any kind of soap opera to try to maintain, in one way or another, some audience that justifies their advertising rates. Nowadays, paying for advertising in traditional media is more expensive and less effective than ever. It is far more economical and yields infinitely superior results to do so through social networks.

If these media outlets are still billing, it is for only two reasons: the first is that their business friends decide to advertise with them as a gift to keep them afloat out of mere ideological affinity. The second is that, unfortunately, many heads of marketing and advertising in various companies do not have the slightest idea of how they are throwing their companies' money into the trash by advertising in these pseudo media outlets.

That empire once held by these large television networks has definitively died. The internet and social networks have democratized information to an unprecedented level. This, undoubtedly, has brought new and great challenges, but it has also empowered the people, giving them greater options to stay informed and, crucially, to avoid manipulation not only from traditional media, but from any actor attempting to impose their truth.





Particularly, we will be waiting with great interest for the next opinion poll and, of course, the upcoming elections. It is in those spaces of true democratic expression where the bucket of cold water will fall and the real "impact" of the published rehash will be seen. These pseudo-journalists desperately attempted to change public perception through multiple publications and assertions without any basis, believing—with first-rate naïveté—that Salvadorans would abandon all the plausible, visible, and tangible achievements that now, and for the first time in our history, we have in our country.

They are intellectual useless beings who are ignorant of the reality of their people. Without a doubt, far from achieving their goal, the people will add even more support to the current president, Nayib Bukele. Conclusion: El Faro and this gossip platform, with their supposed "investigation," only achieved one thing: consolidating even further the democratic process that will lead to the re-election of the current president, Nayib Bukele, in 2027. Thank God, the people have finally awakened.

The Rehash, of the Rehash, of the Rehash of the Rehash...

Recently, a pseudo-journalist from the digital pamphlet “el faro” (in lowercase) posted on a social network: “What is the absurd (or rigged) logic of parties like the FMLN and Arena that, understanding that in El Salvador there is a dictatorship and that its dictator Bukele will re-elect himself no matter what, cheerfully decide to launch presidential candidacies to compete? What competition?”

Our response: The same absurd logic with which they continue with the fuss of the rehash (which no one swallows); they intend to convince a group that is not only convinced of the contrary, but with each new rehash rejects and repudiates them even more. It is the grotesque spectacle of a cheap digital pamphlet that insists on recycling its narrative as if repeating it top to bottom, bottom to top, side to side and vice versa, could alter the collective memory of a people who already lived (and buried) the years of “The Disgust” in El Salvador.

With the same absurd logic, these pseudo-journalists believe that their role as “politically persecuted of the abominable Bukelian dictatorship” gives them credibility. They do not understand that the overwhelming majority of the Salvadoran people continue to support their PRESIDENT (in uppercase), because people are not guided by pamphlets, but by palpable reality: restored security, modern hospitals, dignified schools, functional





highways, and a stabilized economy. They pretend that a rehash repeated a thousand times will change the opinion of those who are already clear about the transformation experienced. But the only thing they achieve is confirming their disconnect from the truth.

The rehash, of the rehash, of the rehash of the rehash... is the perfect metaphor for their decadence.

Each repetition is emptier, vulgarer, more incongruous. And yet, when it comes to receiving the paycheck or going to pick up international awards, those absurd logics become the most rational thing in the world. Then, indeed, the narrative of the rehash makes sense: not to convince the people, but to justify their role as export opponents, luxury self-exiles, men of great “aspirations” in life.

The people know it. They know that those rehashes are not journalism; they are business. They know that they are not the defense of democracy, but the defense of lost privileges. They know that they are not critical voices, but muted echoes of a past that no one wants to relive. Therefore, each new rehash does not erode trust in the national project, but reinforces it: because the comparison between reality and the narrative is so brutal that the lie collapses on its own.

In conclusion, the rehash, of the rehash, of the rehash of the rehash... is nothing more than the confirmation that the media opposition has been reduced to a caricature. And while they insist on their absurd logic, the people insist on their forceful logic: supporting the one who returned security, dignity, and hope to them. As clear as that, as simple as that.

The Political and Ideological Decadence of Opponents and Their Academic and Journalistic Fronts





The principal sign of opponents and their academic and media fronts is, without a doubt, cultural perversity; and this is always the first and last symptom of the political and ideological decadence of individuals and social groups. In the case of opposition political parties, said decadence is the product of rampant corruption, impunity, and treason against the country pushed by their visible leaders, which was possible to justify with the help of reactionary academics (who today disguise themselves as sophists) and journalists (like those of El Faro) who turned gang members into an example for youth to follow to achieve social mobility. The latter is even more decadent because it seeks to pervert the population. The thing is, political and ideological decadence, when irreversible, is evidenced by the constant and accelerated depletion of the moral norms of groups, the loss of historical validity of social institutions, and the replacement (in the Salvadoran case) of the great accounts of the victims with the narrative of the perpetrators. Opposition politicians promoted, when they were in government, the narrative of the perpetrators by claiming that the problem of crime could not be solved, while their fronts (academics, journalists, religious figures, and human rights activists of the perpetrators) justified it and continue to justify it by demanding that the country return to the "due process" that guarantees the human rights of the perpetrators and to the Rule of Law (their perfect democracy) that nourished their savings accounts. The political and ideological decadence of the opponents, both yesterday and today, has multiple explanatory factors, such as:

Perversion of parties, certain newspapers, and human rights organizations, which led all of them without exception to assume a decadent pragmatism in order to, on the one hand, profit from the blood and suffering of the people—the reason why the distance between them and the honest population grew larger every day; and, on the other, transform their institutional frameworks into true money-making machinery using obscure speeches with even darker intentions. Some of those institutions did so to obtain votes and money resulting from corruption, and the others, to obtain money and ill-gotten social prestige. To that must be added that the opponents have impoverished leaderships and mercenary intellectual advisors without theoretical backing or humanist values, which is why they have had to resort to lies and defamation as political doctrine and as electoral arguments.

The political and ideological decadence of the opponents has a direct and increasingly solid result: the massive rejection by citizens, which is measured by the insurmountable emotional and moral distance between voters and the leaders or visible faces of the decadent ones. On its side, ideological decadence is also narrative decadence, not only because the discursive resource of justifying crime is exhausted, but also because they lack weight-bearing arguments that convince the population to believe in them again at the ballot box. Lacking theoretical-political weight in their arguments, they resort to sophisms, false popular speeches, manipulation of data from home-brewed polls, or promoting polls that are as rigged as they are lacking in credibility and rigor.

Another factor of decadence is, without a doubt, the promotion of cultural maladaptation, aimed at making the population adopt as their own the socio-cultural identity of the corrupt and gang members, thereby normalizing crime to such a degree that it is seen as something necessary.

Now then, the political and ideological decadence of the opponents has consequences for democracy. The opponents have specialized in the formulation of a policy of collective suicide, in the sense that it seeks to have voters deny the conquered peace and return to the past of blood, for which they draft speeches claiming that fighting crime deteriorates human rights. However, the population is clear that what has been achieved in these seven years of Nayib Bukele's government is the new cultural heritage of Salvadorans, and as such, it will be defended at the ballot box and in the streets.

The Person Who Builds a Present Can Criticize the Past



With this lapidary phrase, the master of postmodernism Friedrich Nietzsche brought to the social stage a primordial element that can be used in political matters: "Only he who builds the future has the right to judge the past." Certainly, only he who, in his present, shapes better ways of life for the future, possesses sufficient moral standing to determine which aspects of the past were incoherent, malicious, and detrimental regarding the well-being of the great majorities.

It is thus that outlining what is being built in the country is a clear demonstration of the vision of a nation that President Nayib Bukele and Vice President Félix Ulloa h. are achieving: solid foundations in the present for a better future for the



Salvadoran people. It is clear that the future belongs to him who, with his capacity and his will, can do what the majority only talks about; the country's opposition has so many postures, but no real and viable proposal; furthermore, let us consider that they had their time when they governed.

Hence, responsibility does not lie in saying what to do, but rather in doing, in building a better country where the majorities feel dignified and, above all, an existing part of a homeland. El Salvador is building the foundations of that great country that will be inherited by children and grandchildren and that will undoubtedly become a benchmark not only in public security, but also in education, health, tourism, technology, and social peace, which, in the end, is the ultimate goal of every State.

In such a manner, when the development of any goal is reached, the result becomes more than a consequence; it becomes part of this ideal; it gives itself when he who gives, gives. Therefore, only he who is capable of materializing what has been idealized deserves the respect of judging the past, and that is what is recognized in the president, which is why the great majorities of the country deposit their trust in every decision that the leader together with his deputies decides; since he has shown more than enough capacity for it.

In this regard, the master Peter Drucker establishes: "the best way to predict the future is to create it." And precisely that is what is being established in our nation: the future is predicted by building a better El Salvador, not with borrowed formulas, but with created formulas, which is why they usually face so much resistance; for everything new seems dangerous to someone accustomed to the status quo that only favors themselves. Unity around the vision of our leader is what must be nurtured and sustained over time.



From SICA to the Central American Union



Central American integration processes, after the colonial regime and the independence of the Central American provinces, have been the subject of discussion and analysis by the region's governments; but it was back in the 1960s when efforts were made to achieve a Central American union focused on trade, thus giving rise to organizations such as ODECA, promoting a Central American Common Market.

However, a series of internal conflicts and an imbalance in the commercial trade balance—since not all countries obtained the same economic benefit—generated discontent and caused a stagnation in this first attempt.

In the year 1986, at the summit in Esquipulas, Guatemala, an effort was made to restart that process; but it was not until the year 2010, when the region's leaders signed a Joint Declaration in San Salvador, El Salvador, that the fundamental pillars were established to relaunch a new SICA and redefine the core areas of action. These would encompass regional security, trade facilitation, breaking down tariff barriers, a customs union, regional security and cultural policies, and others required by the transformation process, as well as reforms to the legal foundations of the system.

Nevertheless, despite all these efforts, the results have been very few and variable for each country. For that reason, in recent days, the Vice Presidency of the Republic under Dr. Félix Ulloa h., a prominent constitutionalist, launched a new proposal to transform the Central American Integration System (SICA) into a Central American Union, aiming to strengthen its constituent institutions in a more dynamic and effective manner. This would allow progress in cooperation



across key areas such as trade, investment, mobility, security, and others that promote the development of the region's countries.

Achieving a deeper restructuring of SICA could make it more competitive in the global market, improving competitiveness and reinforcing its member institutions and agencies to modernize processes. If this proposal manages to be implemented, the region would achieve a stronger positioning in the global economy.

Security, Order, Peace, and Tourism in The August Festivities 2026

The August 2026 holidays have come to an end—one of the most deeply rooted festivities in Salvadoran identity and tradition. For decades, this holiday period signified for thousands of families an ordeal marked by caution, involuntary confinement, or strict mobility restrictions imposed by criminal structures. Going to the beach, visiting a mountain town, or walking at night through the Historic Center were prohibited activities, subject to fear or extortion. Today, the reality that framed the August Festivities is radically opposite: the country breathes an unprecedented atmosphere of peace, tranquility, and order that invites the full enjoyment of domestic tourism across all fourteen departments.





From a criminological and public security management perspective, the transformation experienced by El Salvador confirms a fundamental premise: the recovery of territorial control by the government of President Nayib Bukele is the indispensable pillar for social cohesion and economic development. When the citizenry perceives real levels of certainty and the absence of risk, community dynamics change—something criminology has established for approximately 150 years. The projections and expectations of national tourism we witnessed in this period are not the result of chance, but the direct outcome of a policy of prevention, deterrent neutralization, and systematic prosecution of crime. Free mobility, a fundamental right undermined for years, has been fully consolidated.

The Institutional Pillar: PNC and Armed Forces

This peaceful environment that today allows Salvadoran families to move freely throughout the national territory rests upon a rigorous and disciplined operational articulation. It is only fair to highlight the decisive performance of our National Civil Police (PNC), an institution that has demonstrated a high level of tactical efficiency in executing citizen protection plans. Its deterrent and close-proximity presence on highways, in parks, forests, and historic centers guarantees that recreational activities proceed without any setbacks. The word POLICIA in gold over the heart stands out with its presence and support for the population.



To this effort is added the strategic and invaluable support of the Armed Forces of El Salvador, whose complementary work has been decisive in projecting security, stability, and control in every corner of the national territory. The synergy between both institutions has not only dismantled the operability of criminal gang groups, but has generated a comprehensive security model where prevention and constant physical presence inhibit any attempt to disrupt public order. And the Armed Forces fulfill their constitutional mission and tasks ordered by high command nationwide and in support of the population.

The ANSP: Generational Shift and Citizen Service

A component of particular relevance in the security deployment for the past August 2026 holidays and previous ones under the present administration is the active incorporation of students from the National Public Security Academy (ANSP). The integration of future basic-level agents and future sub-inspector officers into patrolling, surveillance, and citizen care tasks represents a double methodological success:

- **Operational reinforcement:** Increases coverage and response capacity of law enforcement and security forces at points with high tourist concentration.
- **Comprehensive training:** Provides students with valuable practical field immersion, strengthening their skills in public and citizen security, criminology, mediation, and service to the population. Through specialized training in the English language, they will be of great support to tourists in places such as the airport, historic center, Surf City circuits, and tourist sites, among others.

Observing this new generation of security professionals interacting with the population reinforces institutional trust and sends a clear message of continuity in dignifying police work.





— SIGLO XXI —

Social peace does not emerge by chance; it is built through determination, evidence-based public policy design, and the tireless dedication of human talent from the PNC, Armed Forces, and support from the Police Academy. In these August 2026 holidays, the population and tourists enjoyed the achievements of having recovered the freedom to travel through their country without fear. El Salvador is revitalizing its economy through domestic tourism; it is celebrating the restoration of order, where streets, parks, and beaches once again belong to those to whom they always should have belonged: Salvadoran families.

Thanks to the Territorial Control Plan, families did not spend these holidays gathered in shopping malls because they couldn't visit relatives; those are no longer neutral meeting points. Now they were able to—and will continue to—enjoy their country. It was a great family time, and now we move on to the final stage of this 2026 to continue the development and transformation of El Salvador with security as a cross-cutting axis.

What Is Security to a Salvadoran?



If a foreigner were to ask a Salvadoran what security means to them, the answer would probably not be limited to talking about statistics or the number of crimes that occur. Security is also understood from something much more everyday: being able to go out at night with family and return home without fear, being able to take children to a park without thinking something might happen to them, walking down the street without fear of being mugged, murdered, or disappeared.



This way of understanding security makes sense when we remember the reality El Salvador lived through for years, marked by high homicide rates and the presence of criminal groups in different territories. For many families, going out at certain hours, visiting certain places, or even walking through some communities could represent a risk like “Never Returning Home.”

At present, one of the differences is being able to carry out activities that were previously accompanied by fear; now it is common to find people using their cell phones in public spaces, taking their phones out on buses, walking down the street with phone in hand, or carrying a laptop and other personal belongings with them.

This may seem normal to those of us who live this reality daily, but it takes on another dimension when we leave the country. Elsewhere, people may have to be much more attentive to their belongings, avoid using their phone in certain spaces, or constantly keep in mind the possibility of being a victim of a crime. That is when one can understand that security consists not only in having fewer crimes, but also in the peace of mind with which people can go about their daily lives.

Therefore, when we talk about security, we also talk about trust and freedom to use public spaces. Being able to walk down a street, use public transportation, visit a park, use a cell phone, or return home at night without constantly living with the fear of being a victim of a crime represents an important change in people's lives.

It is even striking to observe how some foreigners arrive in the country precisely to see this new reality for themselves. Some enter communities or places that were previously considered dangerous, record videos, host livestreams, or walk the streets using their cell phones. The fact that they can carry out these activities and share their experience publicly reflects how the perception of security can transform the way people use and experience public spaces.

In this sense, security to a Salvadoran is not only the absence of crime; it is also reclaiming the peace of mind to do things that for years were conditioned by fear.



Merchants of Death

Recently Univision, one of the best-known television networks, using information gathered from figures known as the “crystal exiles”—among whom the digital newspaper El Faro of known background stands out, as they are the ones who from abroad have been in charge of issuing all kinds of fallacies against the government of President Nayib Bukele—and it is known that they are financed by Human Rights Watch, read George Soros, whose family has a perverse agenda against the people and government of El Salvador.

With the latest documentary presented by a television station, several elements stand out: displaying a supposed investigative process into the teenage years of current President Nayib Bukele, coupled with an alleged pact with the gangs, and seeking to discredit a government that put an end to the merchants of death. For it is these gentlemen from El Faro who, according to investigations carried out in the past by the authorities and confirmed by current ones, are the ones who dared to say that if gangs were fought, there would be a fall in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and it would trigger a social conflict. That is how far these journalists go; however, the reality of the country tells us the opposite, because since people no longer pay *renta* or extortion, they have greater purchasing power and, consequently, a greater flow of circulating capital in the country.

The objective of that documentary has only generated the reverse effect of what the merchants of death intended: for the President's image, apart from becoming much more widely known, the population itself rejects those who created it and the media outlet that broadcast it. It is like everything the opposition does—it always turns into more support and greater popularity for President Bukele.

No to the merchants of death





If There Is an Accusation, There Must Be Evidence, Otherwise...

On an opinion program on a television network, a person issued statements in which they asserted that the government of President Nayib Bukele finalized a pact with criminal gangs, adding that making a deal with criminals is a "strategic decision" of President Bukele and his government.

Such statements on open television, cable, and social networks represent declarations that can be considered *notitia criminis*—that is, the knowledge acquired by a competent authority regarding the



commission of a possible crime or crimes. And regarding this, one cannot ignore that the corresponding evidence must be presented. These types of declarations, moreover, require responsibility in filing a formal report, as one could be facing a possible crime: the omission of reporting a crime, which is defined in the penal code.

These declarations are an offense to all the human talent providing services in the Police, Armed Forces, Attorney General's Office, and Penal Centers, who have suffered murders and severe injuries at the hands of criminal gangs and continue to risk their lives to consolidate the pacification of the country and win the war against gangs.

Our support and endorsement to President Bukele and his expanded Security Cabinet for bringing peace to El Salvador through the Territorial Control Plan and the support of the state of exception.

The Trap of the "Strategic Pact"

In recent public debate, a figure who sails under the flag of being aligned with President Bukele's government claimed to believe that there indeed was a pact with the gangs, although presenting it as “strategic” to buy time before the 2022 security offensive.

This constitutes an analytical recklessness. Far from being a clever defense, this stance uncritically validates the opposition narrative without possessing any evidence to support it, challenging the very reality of



the process. Accepting this premise entails two extremely grave implications that directly affect the executive's institutional and legal line:

- **Discrediting the official word:** It categorically contradicts the statements of President Bukele, who has flatly denied any agreement with criminal structures. Taking the pact as fact is equivalent to maintaining that the president deceived the citizenry from the beginning.
- **Exposure to criminal liability:** Within the Salvadoran legal framework, negotiating with terrorist groups or gangs is a serious crime. Clear precedents exist of former officials prosecuted and imprisoned for this cause; therefore, attributing an agreement to the government exposes the president to potential judicial consequences.

From our Political Reflection Circle, we consider it essential to detect these types of discursive traps so as not to err on the side of naïveté nor feed, involuntarily or irresponsibly, "fifth column" dynamics. The defense and analysis of the current situation demand sharpness and communicational responsibility against an opposition narrative that uses any resource to reverse the achievements made. The trap of the "strategic pact"



Clarification Note

The Siglo XXI Political Reflection Circle informs that Lic. Carlos Huezo ceased to be part of this collective as of July 6, 2026. We appreciate his contributions during the time he was with us and wish him success in his future projects and activities.

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